The High Cost of Winning: How Private Equity and City Hall Are Selling Out Youth Soccer

On a Saturday morning at the McKinney Soccer Complex at Craig Ranch, the parking lot is full, but many local families aren't there to play. They can't afford to.

What was once a community gathering place funded by taxpayer bonds has become the factory floor for a $40 billion youth sports industry. As private equity firms aggressively consolidate local clubs and municipalities chase the elusive "sports tourism" dollar, a quiet crisis is unfolding on the fields of North Texas. The result is a pay-to-play ecosystem that segregates children by income, privatizes public assets, and turns childhood play into a high-yield financial asset.

The Financialization of Childhood

The landscape of youth soccer is shifting from non-profit community boards to Wall Street boardrooms. Institutional investors have identified youth sports as a "recession-proof" asset class, where parental anxiety about a child's future drives "emotionally durable" spending.

Leading this charge is 3STEP Sports, backed by Juggernaut Capital. In a massive "roll-up" strategy, 3STEP has acquired over 1,800 club teams and now manages 2,500 events annually. In North Texas, this consolidation is visible in the operations of Sting Soccer Club, a historic organization now integrated into the 3STEP ecosystem. This vertical integration allows conglomerates to control the player, the tournament, the facility, and the media rights, effectively capturing the entire "share of wallet" of a sports family.

Similarly, Steel Sports, a subsidiary of the publicly traded holding company Steel Partners (NYSE: SPLP), has established a significant footprint with Steel United TX. Unlike traditional non-profits, Steel Partners lists youth sports alongside industrial products and banking as a core business segment, applying corporate efficiency models to youth coaching.

"It's not about sports. It's never been about sports," writes one industry analyst. "It's about identifying trapped consumers... and systematically extracting maximum value from their desperation.”

The Public-Private Trap

To generate returns on these massive investments, "Super Clubs" need elite facilities. This is where local governments, eager for revenue, have become complicit partners.

In McKinney, the City Council authorized a $23.9 million contract to renovate the Craig Ranch Soccer Complex, converting grass fields to synthetic turf. While pitched as an upgrade for residents, city documents explicitly state the goal was to "increase tournament capabilities". Turf fields require high-revenue tenants to justify their cost, incentivizing the city to prioritize tournament operators like U90C Sports and Premier International Tours over local recreational leagues.

This dynamic has led to the effective privatization of public land. In the landmark case City of McKinney v. KLA International Sports Management, the Texas Court of Appeals ruled that the city had waived its governmental immunity by entering into what was essentially a commercial contract for field services. The court found that because the city received "services" (field maintenance) in exchange for granting exclusive license rights, the arrangement was a business transaction, not a governmental function.

The implication is profound: when cities trade priority access for capital improvements, they are legally stripping themselves of the ability to manage those lands strictly for the public good. The fields become, for the duration of the lease, a corporate asset.

The Price of Admission

For families, the costs of this new ecosystem are staggering. While recreational play through the McKinney Soccer Association costs approximately $115 per season, elite participation in leagues like the ECNL (Elite Clubs National League) can exceed $10,000 annually.

Solar Soccer Club, a dominant force in the region, reported annual revenues of $6.88 million in 2024. The club enforces strict "no refund" policies, pushing families to purchase "Sports Fee Protection" insurance—a financial product that treats a child's roster spot as an insurable asset.

The extraction continues through the "Stay-to-Play" mandate enforced by tournament operators. Families traveling for events are forbidden from booking their own hotels; they must use a designated housing agency that marks up room rates, with the "kickback" split between the agency and the tournament operator.

"The tournament organizer got a kickback on every room sold," noted one parent regarding the opaque pricing models that have become industry standard.

Locked Out

As costs rise, the demographic base of the sport narrows. Participation among children from households earning under $50,000 is declining, while wealthier families spend exponentially more to secure their children's spot in the "college pathway" pipeline.

Meanwhile, local access to Independent School District (ISD) facilities remains restricted. McKinney ISD's rental policy grants priority to groups comprised of "75% district students," a threshold that large, PE-backed clubs administratively manipulate to secure access while smaller, neighborhood groups struggle with insurance requirements of $1 million in liability coverage.

The result is a two-tiered system: a luxury product for the affluent, backed by private equity and facilitated by town leadership, and a shrinking, underfunded commons for everyone else.

As McKinney continues to market itself as a "unique destination" for sports tourism , the question remains: is the city building a community for its residents, or a venue for its investors?

A Breach of the Public Trust

The transformation of McKinney’s soccer fields from community assets into corporate revenue centers is not an accident; it is a policy choice. When a municipality prioritizes the "sports tourism" dollar over the accessibility of its own residents, it breaks the fundamental social contract of local government. Public bonds are overwhelmingly approved by voters with the understanding that they are funding public goods, not subsidized infrastructure for private equity portfolios.

As 3STEP Sports, Steel Partners, and U90c continue to consolidate the market, and as "Super Clubs" lock down facilities with exclusionary contracts, the "Beautiful Game" is being strip-mined for profit. The winners are clear: the shareholders, the tournament operators, and the hospitality industry. The losers are the families priced out of their own parks.

If the City of McKinney and other municipalities continue to view youth sports solely through the lens of economic impact reports rather than community health, they will succeed in building world-class facilities—but they will have evicted the community they were meant to serve.